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T
HIS paper traces the major developments
of lasting value in our understanding of
the monetary mechanism and its role in the
economy which have occurred since the early
forties, when the process of digesting the Gen-
eral Theory [ii] and integrating it with the
earlier streams of thinking had been more or
less completed.I consider here primarily the
state of monetary thought as of about the
mid-fifties, leaving to another time considera-
tion of the evolution that has occurred since.
The middle of the 1950'S provides, in my
view, a useful landmark inreviewing the
evolutionofmonetary and macroeconomic
theory, since the developments that occurred
up to that time are, on the whole, rather dif-
ferent in purpose and approach from those
that have occurred later. The development in
the first-mentioned period seems to me to con-
sist largely of refinements, clarifications, and
developments of the basic framework, which
had already been laid out by the early forties.
The most significant contributions in the more
recent period, on the other hand, have tended
to approach monetary issues in terms of the
theory of asset management and portfolio de-
cisions, exploiting concurrent advances in the
theory of saving, in managerial economics and,
most importantly, in the theory of choice under
uncertainty.Thesedevelopments,onthe
whole, have not led to any major revision or
rejection of the positions reached by the mid-
fifties, but have rather been concerned with
providing a better understanding of the de-
terminants of the demand for money and its
relation withthe demand and supplyfor
various other assets, physical as well asfi-
nancial, by final transactors and by "financial
intermediaries."
This paper is, in essence, a summary of a
longer and more rigorous statement which I
expect to complete later, and which, together
with an exploration of the developments since
the willbe published elsewhere when
completed. Because it is in the nature of a
summary, I have frequently found it necessary
to sacrifice rigor and to omit nearly all of the
proofs and many of the references.
The material is divided into six major sec-
tions.The firstis a brief comparison of a
basic model of money and the economy which
Ibelieve would have been widely accepted
about 1944, with a corresponding model as of
the middle of the 1950's. The following sec-
tions, then, examine in some detail the im-
plications of the mid-fifties model for the rela-
tionship to crucial variables in the economy,
and for major lines of monetary and fiscal
policy.
I
The Mid-50's Model and Its Relation
to the 1944 Model
I hope I may be permitted the libertyof
using the macroeconomic model presented in
my 1944 article, "Liquidity Preference and the
Theory of Interest in Money" [13],asa rep-
resentationof where monetary economists
thought money stood in relation to the econ-
omy at about that period. This model is repro-
duced in Table i(with very minor modifica-
tions of notation), together with a revised
version labeled the "Mid-5o's model."This
is essentially the model that I would have used
had I been writing a comparable article at that
time (and did actually use in my class lec-
tures, cf.
While no systematic attempt is made here
at justifying in detail the equations of the
model, a task which was substantially per-
formed in the 1944 paper, in this section we
will review the main differences as well as
similarities between the original and the re-
vised model.
The two models are basically identical in
spirit: they both treat the economy at a highly
aggregative level in terms of four goods and
corresponding markets. Two of the goods are
physical commodities, labor and real output,
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and two are money-fixed claims, money and
bonds. For the sake of concreteness, real out-
putisvisualized as consisting of a single
homogeneous commodity which, in the mid-
fifty model, I choose to label the MM (read
mum). This output can be either used for cur-
rent consumption (C) and thereby disappears,
or can be instead devoted to investment (I),
thereby becoming part of the capital stock
(K). Thus, X, C, I, S are measured in MM/time,
and K in MM's. Similarly, labor (N) is meas-
ured in man-hours/time. The two money-fixed
claims on the other hand are measured in units
of money assumed to be the dollar, and bonds
are to be regarded as one-period loans or claims
to future (next-period) money. The amount
of bonds held by a transactor may be positive
or negative; in the latter case it represents the
transactor's debt.
Corresponding to the four commodities there
are three independent prices or terms of trade
with money: the price of output —orgeneral
price level —P($/MM); the price of labor,
W ($/man-hour); and the price of a dollar,
next period, (i/i + r),wherer is the rate of
interest. In addition, both models, at least at
the outset, assume:
A.x: certainty
A.2: absence of money illusion (which is an
implication of rational behavior)
A.3: unitelasticityofpriceexpectations
(and independence of interest rate ex-
pectations from current prices)
The main differences between the two models
can be summarized under five headings:
i.Explicitreliance on a general equilibrium
formulation. The mid-fifty model is explicitly
structured in terms of markets, one for each
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF 1944 WITH Mm-5o's MODEL
DEFINiTIONS AND CLASSiFICATION OF VARIABLES
I.Endogenous variables
(a) Flow variables: X,Realincome; (2) C, Real consumption; (3) I, Real investment; S, Realsaving; (5)
XL,Real aggregate demand; (6) N, Employment (man-hours per unittime); N, Labor supply; (8)
I', Money income
(b)Pricevariables: P,Priceof output; (io) W, Price of labor (wage rate); (ii) r,Rateof interest
(C) Money market variables: (12) Me', Demand for money by private sector; (13) B9, Demandfor bonds by non-
bankprivate sector; (ia) Demandfor bonds by banks; (i5)M9, Supply of bank money
II."Initialconditions": K, Real stock of capital; Net worth ofhousehold;V v', Aggregate net worth of
private sector; [V,]=v, ..v',, ...).
III.Otherparameters: W,, Rigidmoney wagerate;N',"Full employment" labor supply; M, Moneysupply; M*,
Supplyof government money; M*', Government money outside banks; M*b =M*—M49,Government
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commodity, with each market in turn described
by (a) supply conditions, (b) demand condi-
tions, and (c) clearing of market or equilibrium
conditions, of which one is redundant (Walras'
law).
The main advantage of the general equilib-
rium framework is that it insures a systematic
and, at least initially, symmetrical treatment of
all markets.1 For the commodity market, the
demand conditions are described by equations
(i) to (i); the supply conditions by (4b) and
the clearing conditions by (7).In the labor
market the supply is given by (6), to be re-
viewed more closely below; the demand by (s);
andmarket clearing by (8). The remaining
two markets are described under the next head-
ing, 2.
2. Explicit treatment of the bond market and
more precise formulation of the relation be-
tween the demand and supply of money and
bonds and the banking system. In the
model, the money market was described very
summarily by a single equation (I.i) and the
bond market was omitted altogether.In the
mid-195o's model, the money market is again
described by a demand (M.2),asupply (M.4),
and a clearing of market equation (M.3).
Furthetmore, two sources of money supply to
the private sector are recognized: bank money
(M6) and government money (M*P). The bond
market is described by the last three equations.
is a streamlined consolidated balance
sheet of the banking system (including the cen-
tral bank, if any); the left-hand side is the
liability side or bank money supply, which must
be equal to the asset side consisting of govern-
ment money and bank credit (W)
which can also be regarded as the banking sys-
tem demand for bonds. (M.6) gives the net
demand for bonds by the public, the difference
between lending (gross demand) and borrowing
(gross supply). (M.7) is the clearing of market
condition; the left-hand side is the aggregate
net demand by the private sector and the right-
Without the benefit of this crutch, in my 1944 paper I
was led in the formal model of section2,to drop any
explicit reference to the bond market—implicitly treated
as the redundant one —which,in turn, caused some unfor-
tunate and unnecessary misunderstandings [9]. More ser-
iously, I forgot altogether the existence of this commodity
in the analysis of section 13, which resulted in some outright
wrong statements, as was shown later by Patinkin [aol,
(ax].
hand side is the net supply of bonds to the
private sector, which would be zero in the ab-
sence of government debt, and is otherwise
equal to this debt, G.
While the bond market is thus given explicit
treatment, it isstill permissible to treat this
market as the redundant one and we shall find
it convenient to do so.Furthermore, for the
purpose of this paper, we shall regard the two
components of the money supply and hence
their sum M as exogenously determined by the
government or through the monetary author-
ity's control over the banking system, or both,
without concerning ourselves with the many
possible institutional devices through which
this control can be exercised. Under these con-
ditions it is found that the last four equations,
(M.4) to (M.7) describing the banking system
and the bond market can be disregarded, so
long as one is interested in the functioning of
the rest of the system. This is because the first
twelve equations, consisting of the nine "real
equations" (i) to and the three monetary
equations (M.i) to (M.3), form a determined
subsystem in the first twelve variables listed at
the top of Tablei, namely the eight flow
variables, the three price variables, and the
demand for money. The analysis that follows,
therefore, is primarily concerned with this sub-
system.
3. Improvements in the consumption and in-
vestment function and in particular more ade-
quate recognition of the role of stocks. Since
the mid-forties the consumption function has
received a great deal of attention at both the
theoretical and the empirical levels. Many of
the contributions, and notably the "permanent
income" hypothesis of Friedman and the
"life cycle hypothesis" of Modigliani, Brum-
berg and Ando [ia] [iô] [xJ, have de-empha-
sized the role of current income and emphasized
the role of other variables, particularly long-
term income expectations and wealth. The con-
sumption function (i) is sufficiently general to
be consistent both with the original simple-
minded Keynesian version and with the more
recent but still controversial formulations. In
particular, it is consistent with the life-cycle
hypothesis according to which aggregate con-
sumption can be approximated by a linear
homogeneous function of aggregate labor in-82 THE MONETARY MECHANISM
come and net worth (V0/P), with coeffi-
dents depending in principle on the rate of re-
turn on capital (r) [x].
Similarly, the investment function, or invest-
ment component of aggregate demand (2)can
be shown to be consistent with a wide variety
of approaches and hypotheses, such as the
crude acceleration principle, the so-called "flex-
ible accelerator" or gradual adjustment hypoth-
esis, or even the more traditional formulation
relying upon the production function and the
marginal productivity of capital.Every one
of these approaches implies that investment
demand must be an increasing function of the
level of output and a decreasing (or at least
nonincreasing) function of the initial stock of
capital and of the cost of capital.
4. Correction 0/thefaulty formulation of
the homogeneity properties of the consumption,
investment, and demand formoneyfunctions.
The new formulation of equations (r) and (2)
andof (M.2) implies that the real demand for
consumption, investment, and money is homoge-
neous of zero degree in money income, wealth,
and prices, or the corresponding money demand
is homogeneous of first degree in the same three
variables. This property is an implication of
the assumption of rational behavior.In the
X944 model I had intended to make this same
assumption but in fact did not formulate it
properly;I assumed instead that the three
money demands were homogeneous offirst
degree in money. income alone. This formula-
tion leads to the incorrect implication that a
change in money income has the same ef-
fect on money consumption whether due to
a change in real income with prices constant,
or to a change in prices with real income con-
stant; and similarly for the other two variables.
This error in turn led to a peculiar and objec-
tionable property of the model, to wit that the
first four equations of the model form a closed
subsystem in the four variables (PX) (or F),
PS, P1 and r, involving in particular M as a
parameter. This dichotomization implies that
the equilibrium values of the rate of interest
and the money flow variables are independent
of the real variables of the system, and in par-
ticular of the form of the production function
and of the level at which the rigid money wage
W0 is set. This ceases to be true once the con-
sumption and investment function are proper-
2formulatedas in Model II. In particular,
as shown below, for a given production func-
tion (including in it the initial stock of capital),
and given M, an increase in W0 will normally
tend to result in an increase of r, as well as of
P, money income, investment and consumption,
and in a fall in employment, real income and
the other real flows.3
5. Use of a more convenient and effective
device for expressing the hypothesis of wage
rigidity. This device embodied in equation (6)
relies on the notion of a "potential" supply
function (W/P),expressing the maximum
supply of labor available at each real wage. By
combining this function with the demand func-
tion we can determine the excess supply (or
demand) at any real wage. The hypothesis of
wage rigidity then states that the money wage
will not be bid below the rigid level W0, even if
there is an excess supply at this level.This
hypothesis is formalized in equation (6).In
fact, this equation together with (5b) and (8)
simultaneously implies that W and N are de-
termined by the intersection of the demand
function (sb) and the potential supply func-
tion, if this intersection determines a value of
W larger than W0; otherwise W =W0and the
level of employment is determined by the de-
mand function alone. The difference between
thislevel of employment and the potential
supply at W0 is then "involuntary unemploy-
ment" in the Keynesian sense. Note finally that
equation (6) can also be used to formalize the
classical assumption of wage flexibility by
merely setting W0 equal to zero or, at any rate,
'By "properly," I do not of course mean empirically
correct but merely consistent with the hypothesis I intended
to formalize.
'I might add, in partial defense of my 1944 construction
and for solace to those who may have accepted it, that, if
the production function is given and if W. is treated as an
unchangeable parameter, then the system does imply the
existence of a unique relation between money consumption
or investment, and money income; but then it implies also
a unique relation between these variables and r, so that even
under the stated conditions equation (I.x) and (1.2) could
not be regarded as behavior equations but, at best, as re-
duced forms.Furthermore, the functional form of these
reduced forms would shift around with changes in W. or the
form of the production function. Thus, even though in many
cases my original system leads to "correct" inferences, it is
an unreliable tool of analysis.THE MONETARY MECHANISM 83
sufficiently low to insure that the first line will
apply in the relevant range.
From this brief review it should be apparent
that most of the differences between the 1944
and the mid-fifties model are matters of ele-
gance, clarity, and minor improvements —with
the main exception of the correction of the
error under above.Even the explicit rec-
ognition of the role of stocks examined under
isnot crucial, if we regard the model as
focusing on the determinantsofshort-run
equilibrium, since, in general, stocks are initial
conditions which can be treated as given param-
eters. An exception to this statement must be
made with respect to the inclusion of wealth in
the consumption function, for, in the presence
of a government debt fixed in money terms,
real wealth, V0/P, cannot be regarded as a
given initial condition.As will presently be
shown, the resulting "wealth effect" has inter-
esting logical implications, although itis of
practical relevance only under the assumption
of wage and price flexibility, an assumption
which has little, if any, empirical substance.
The remaining sections of the paper are
devoted to examining various implications of
the model, focusing in part on issues which have
been prominently debated in the period under
review. In the two sections immediately follow-
ing, the analysis rests entirely on the mid-fifties
model discussed so far. Then, in sections IV
and V, this model will be broadened and amend-
ed to allow explicitly for the role of government
and for certain imperfections in the capital
market. Finally, in the concluding section VI,
I endeavor to summarize the results with special
reference to the importance of money and
monetary factors as a determinant of the real
variables.
•II
Implications of the Model Under Price Flexibility
—Homogeneity,Dichotomy, Neutrality, and the
E.ole of the Supply and Demand for Money
We proceed first to a summary of some im-
plications of the model within the classical
framework of price and wage flexibility.Its
main justification is the hope of disposing for
good of a controversy, connected with the
names of Pigou and Patinkin, which has
plagued the profession, draining the resources
into what strikes me as a largely barren en-
deavor.
In essence, the Patinkin controversy revolves
around two main issues concerning the prop-
erties of an economic system relying on a token
money as medium of payment, namely (i)the
neutrality of money and (2)thevalidity of the
dichotomy of monetary and real economics. It
will be useful to define more precisely the
nature of these issues and their implications.
Neutrality. Money is said to be neutral if
the equilibrium value of the real variables of
the system —inour model the flow variables,
X, C, I, N, S, the price ratio P/W, and r —is
independent of the money supply M. If money
is neutral, then at most M can affect the actual
level of prices, or terms of trade between cur-
rent commodities and money —Pand W in our
model. A special case of neutrality is where, in
addition, prices are proportional to M, the so-
called "quantity theory of money."
Dichotomy. This issue can be defined in many
alternative ways, as is apparent from Patinkin
[21] where many possible meanings of the
word are considered and carefully divided into
good ones (valid) and bad ones(invalid).
The problem I am concerned with here might be
defined in terms of certain mathematical prop-
erties of systems of simultaneous relations or,
instead, in terms of the substantive economic
issues involved.
If we take the first approach, we may say
that the dichotomy holds if the system of simul-
taneous relations purporting to describe the
functioning of the economy has the following
property: the entire set of relations can be
"dichotomized" into two subsets, one of which,
containing the relations describing the func-
tioning of all markets except the money and
bond market, forms a determinate subsystem
of the entire system and is therefore sufficient
to determine all the real variables of the system.
Obviously, if the dichotomy in the above sense
holds, then the equilibrium value of the real
variables is independent of the money supply
—i.e.,dichotomy implies neutrality. But in ad-
'This definition of the quantity theory of money Is
obviously quite different from the one adopted by Friedman
in (6] and is, I believe, more consistent with generally ac-
cepted terminology.84 THE MONETARY MECHANISM
dition these equilibrium values are also inde-
pendent of the form of the demand-for-money
equation. This last implication is, of course,
the significant one from the economic point of
view, for it justifies separating the study of the
functioning of a free market economy into a
"monetary" and a "real" branch. In particular,
when concerned with the real variables we need
pay no attention to monetary habits and insti-
tutions (although the converse need not be
true).
This then suggests an alternative and prob-
ably more fruitfuldefinition of dichotomy,
namely, as a warranted separation of monetary
and real economics (or value theory). Specifi-
cally, we can say that the dichotomy holds if
the equilibrium value of the real variables of
the system is independent of both the supply
and the demand for money. Note that in this
second sense it is quite possible for the dichot-
omy to hold in the long but not in the short
run (or, conceivably, vice versa).
Of course, to the extent that the equilibrium
of the system (whether in the short or in the
long run) can be identified with the solution of
a system of simultaneous relations, dichotomy
in the first sense implies dichotomy in the sec-
ond. But our second definition is broader and
is a proposition about the real world, even
though in passing judgment about its validity
we may have to rely on the mathematical
properties of certain formal descriptions there-
of. Note finally that, in terms of our second
definition, we can meaningfully say that the
dichotomy is"approximately" valid,in the
sense that it provides a good first approximation
to observed phenomena.
In terms ofthesedefinitions,Patinkin's
basic contention can be summarized as follows:
in an economy relying on a token money as a
medium of exchange, the dichotomy does not
hold, but under certain conditions money will
be neutral. In particular the following two as-
sumptions, in addition to assumptions A.r to
A.3 above, are generally sufficientforthe
neutrality to hold (ci. [21], especially chapters
IV, VIII, and Mathematical Appendix 4).
A.4, Concerning the functioning of markets:
absence of price rigidity in any market
A.5, Concerning tastes: the market demand
and supply for each commodity is in-
variant under a redistribution of wealth
among transactors
It is found that Patinkin's contention is basically
unwarranted, although no attempt at rigorous
proof is possible here. Furthermore, while the
argument runs in terms of the aggregative
model of Section I, it holds as well if we recog-
nize the existence of many different commodi-
ties and kinds of labor.Specifically, the fol-
lowing propositions can be established (for a
closed economy).
(i) If the money supply consists entirely of
bank money and there is no government debt,6
the dichotomy is valid.7 Basically the reason is
that under these conditions, and assumptions
A.i to all the demand and supply equa-
tions for commodities are homogeneous of zero
degree in the prices, P and W, and hence can
be expressed as functions of their ratio, W/P.
This holds in particular for the consumption
function (i). In fact, A.5 implies that wealth
affects consumption only through its aggregate
value V0/P. But VO/P in turn can be replaced
by the initial stock of physical capital K0, since
the money component of aggregate net worth is
exactly offset by the indebtedness to the bank-
ing system (cf. Memo iv in Table x). Thus P
appears in the consumption function only in the
form W/P.8 It can be readily verified that
5Patinkin has been especially concerned with what may
be called "neutrality in principle," i.e.,neutrality with re-
spect to a "neutral" change in the money supply, which is
defined as one that leaves undisturbed the relative distribu-
tion of cash balances. For this type of neutrality, Patinkin
does not need assumption A.5. However, as will be apparent
from (2) and below, when neutrality does not hold with
assumption "neutralityin principle" does not hold
either.
'By government debt is meant here any claim (positive
or negative) of the private sector (including banks) on the
government, whether interest bearing or not.Hence, the
assumption of no government debt implies that M*P,
and G are alt zero, which, using (M.4), and (M.7),
in turn implies M =Mb=B'=—Br.In other words, the
money supply consists entirely of what Gurley and Shaw
call "inside money" (cf. [8] p. 73).
'This conclusion, which was stated in my xg6o Postscript
to 113], has recently been acknowledged by Patinkin
in his very useful review of Gurley and Shaw [8], which
also contains some of the results summarized under
below.
'Note that the consumption demand—as well as labor
supply —ofindividuai households will generally not be
homogeneous of zero degree in prices.Indeed changes in
the price level affect individual wealth by determining the
real value of money fixed claims and debts. However, since
aggregatewealthis unaffected, such changes only result inTHE MONETARY MECHANISM
under these conditions the first nine equations
of the model form a determined subsystem in
all the real variables including the price ratio
W/P. This subsystem is therefore sufficient to
determine these variables without any reference
to the supply of money or to the demand for
money equation (M.2). The only role of the
monetary part is to determine the price level P,
and hence finally also W.Furthermore,if
assumption A.5 is extended to the demand for
money, then it also turns out that P is strictly
proportional to M so that the quantity theory
also holds.
It may be useful to try to state in plain Eng-
lish the major forces determining equilibrium
in the system described by Model II under the
stated assumptions. This mechanism can be
summarized roughly as follows:
i. Given the production function, including
the initial stock of capital, and hence consumers
net worth, and given the preferences for cur-
rent arid future consumption as compared with
leisure, there is a unique real-wage rate W/P
that clears the labor market, and leads in turn
to a unique level of output X: this corresponds
to the simultaneous solutions of the four equa-
tions to(6) and (8) in the four variables,
P1W, N,and X.
ii. For given X, preferences for current ver-
sus later consumption (including in later con-
sumption planned bequests) and the terms of
trade between them, represented by r,deter-
mine the size of current consumption C and
the desired carry-over of resources, S =X—
C.It is the function of the rate of interest to
insure that investors will be induced to add to
the stock of capital an amount I equal to the
desired carry-over S.These forces are de-
scribed by the remaining five real equations of
the system, (x) to (s),and (p), and com-
plete the determinants of the real variables.
iii. Given the real solution, the price level
together with certain institutional factors (such
as length of the income period, synchronization
of receipt and expenditure, transaction costs,
etc.) determine the demand for money arising
from transaction requirements and, possibly,
also on asset account. There is then a unique
price level that equates the demand to the
a redistribution of wealth between households, which by
does not affect aggregatedemandsand supplies.
exogenous supply M. This same price level
also induces the private sector to issue, on bal-
ance, enough claims against itself to satisfy the
banking system demand for bonds, which banks
pay with M,9
The determination of the price level can be
exhibited graphically as in Figure i, in terms
THE ROLE OF THE SUPPLY OF MONEY IN THE DETER-
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of the coordinates of the point of intersection
of two curves in the (r,P) plane.(Actually,
on the ordinate itis convenient to plot the
logarithm of P/PQ, where P0 may be thought of
as the previously ruling price.) One of these
curves is the graph of the line r= r,perpendic-
ular to the r axis, stating the rate of
interest must be at the level ;thatclears the
commodity market and which is determined
by the real part of the system. The other,
denoted by LL, is the graph of the equation
that must be satisfied in order for the money
market to be cleared, namely: P X L(r, X, K0)
=M.Treating M asa given parameter
and X as already determined by the real part
of the system, this equation can be looked
upon as a relation between the two variables
r and P.Its graph shows, in effect, the be-
it• is apparent from the above that even in a system
relying entirely on "inside money" the determinancy of the
price level can be established without reference, explicit or
implicit, to Gurley and Shaw "portfolio balance" or "diver-
siñcation" mechanism ([8], especially Chap. V). Indeed that
mechanism is intimately related to their very objectionable
treatment of firms as separate and self-contained entities.
In our model the net worth of firms is treated as a com-
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havior of the so-called income velocity of cir-
culation (more precisely its logarithm) as a
function of the interest rate, except for a pro-
portionality factor, MIX. It can be expected
to rise from left to right, since a priori con-
siderations abundantly supported by empirical
evidence (see, e.g., [12], [29], [2], [30]) sug-
gest that, as rrises,velocity rises, the real
demand for money falls (since k is given) and
hence P must rise to reduce the real supply.
The position of LL depends, of course, on the
money_supply M. A change in this supply
from M to say M' would shift it parallel to
itself by a distance log (M'/M).
While the general shape of the LL graph is
clear within the empirically observed range
of variation of r,theremay be some doubts as
to its behavior for extreme values.For in-
stance, as rgrowsindefinitely the graph may
rise indefinitely or may instead approach some
asymptote.Similarly, there is some question
as to whether rcanever be bid down to zero.
But whatever views one might hold about the
possibility of a zero interest rate, one thing
is certain, namely that in perfect markets, and
as long as money has negligible storage costs,
the money market can never be cleared with
a negative r.For,even if banks were prepared
to lend at a negative rate, everybody would
wish to borrow "infinitely large" amounts and
hold the money so borrowed to earn the pre-
mium now paid to borrowers. Hence the de-
mand for money (as well as the supply of
bonds) must become infinite at rates more than
negligibly negative; and for any finite supply
of money M there would be an excess demand
for money and the money market would not
be cleared. This means that the locus of LL
lies entirely in the half plane to the right of
a line perpendicular to the abscissa and coin-
ciding withtheordinateaxis,or possibly
negligibly to the left of it, on account of the
storage cost of money, if any.
As can be seen from the figure, if the money
authorityisconcerned with maintaining a
constant price level, then it should set the
money supply at a level such that the corres-
ponding LL curve intersects the other curve
on the raxis,where log (P/P0) =oor P =F,.
If we visualize the mechanism of price deter-
mination as one in which prices stay put at some
given level as long as at that level the market
is cleared, and rise (or fall)if at that level
thereis an excess demand (or an excess
supply), then the task of the money authority
in maintaining a stable price level can be stated
in a somewhat different and not uninteresting
form. That is, instead of enforcing directly
the money supply M*' of Figure i, it may en-
deavor, through appropriate devices, to en-
force the rate of interest r'= r andthen let the
money supply seek its own level in response
to .the demand generated by the initial price
level P and the given value of r.Ifit succeeds
in picking and enforcing a rate r'equalto the
natural rate r,thenthe money supply will be
precisely M' as we can see from the figure.
Of course, if r'isset too low there will be
excess demand which will raise P and cause an
expansion in M, and this process will tend to
continue as long as r'isenforced —thisis
simply the familiar Wicksellian cumulative
process of inflation.Conversely, if r'isset
too high there will be cumulative deflation
and contractionin M. The only way of
stopping the cumulativeinflationiseither
to raise r'tothe right level or to clamp down
on the money supply letting rseekits equilib-
rium level, at r.
Theabove analysis is subject to one im-
portant qualification, namely that the two
equations graphed in the figure may fail to
possess a solution.This failure is bound to
occur if r,thevalue of r that is consistent
with clearing the commodity market, is nega-
tive; and there is nothing impossible in prin-
ciple aboutbeing negative, whatever might
be the factual relevance of this possibility.
Under these conditions the value of rthat
clears the commodity market cannot clear the
money market, and conversely.In graphical
terms, if risnegative, then the line r =r lies
to the left of the ordinate, and therefore can-
not have a point of intersection with LL which
must lie entirely to its right.
This possibility, which is,of course, the
"Keynesian case," or liquidity trap, might oc-
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but is bound to occur if r is negative. The eco-
nomic system, then, does not possess a resting
point except through wage rigidity, or appro-
priate interferences with the market process,
includingdevicesformaking moneysuf-
ficiently expensive to store.
In summary, with pure bank money the
classicalconclusionsaboutneutralityand
dichotomy are valid, and so is the Keynesian
contention that a market system may not
possess a position of equilibrium.
(2)Ifthe money supply consists entirely of
government money and there is no other form
of national debt,'° then money is neutral but
the dichotomy does not hold, i.e., the equilib-
rium value of the real variables is independent
of the supply but not of the demand for money.
This is the assumption underlying Patinkin's
analysis and his conclusion stands in this case.
The dichotomy breaks down because the vari-
able VQ/P now can be expressed at K0 + M/P,
and hence P appears in the consumption func-
tion (i)separatelyand not merely in the form
of a price ratio W/P. Thus, the first nine equa-
tions of the system now involve xo unknowns
and cannot be solved separately. However, this
subsystem can be solved for the nine real
variables in terms of M/P, the "real money
supply."Inparticular,letr(M/P)and
X(M/P) be the solution for r and X. By in-
serting this solution into the clearing condition
for the money market one obtains
X(M/P),
This equation in the single variable M/P yields
a solution, say (M/P), which in turn can be
used to obtain the solution for all the remain-
ing real variables. This solution implies that the
real money supply and all the real variables
are independent of the nominal money supply.
In other words, money is neutral in that a
change in M merely changes P in proportion
(P =M
)butleaves the equilibrium value
(M/P)
of the real variables unchanged. Yet these
equilibrium values are not invariant under a
shift in the demand function for money ex-
"°Inthe terminology of Gurley and Shaw, the money
supply consists entirely of "outside" money (cf. [8] pp. 72—
pressed by L, for in general a change in this
function would give rise to a different solution
for M/P, and, hence, for the real variables.
Inthe presence of national debt or with
a mixed money supply, neither the dichotomy
nor the neutrality holds. This conclusion can
be shown to follow from the previous two. Just
how a change in the money supply or in the
demand for money will affect the real variables
of the system depends on which component of
the supply is changed and on the relative size
of the components and of the national debt. As
an illustration, consider the empirically most
relevant case where the money supply consists
entirely of bank money and the national debt is
positive. Then an increase in the money supply,
by increasing P and reducing real wealth, will
tend to increase saving and reduce the rate of
interest to the extent necessary to produce a
matching increment in investment. But differ-
ent conclusions would hold under other assump-
tions, which need not be analyzed in this
summary.
The results summarized under (i)to
aboveare helpful in assessing the theoretical
and empirical relevance of explicitly recogniz-
ing the dependence of consumption on wealth,
to which attention was first called by the well-
known contributions of Scitovsky and Pigou
[27],[22), [23].From(z)above it is ap-
parent that this recognition has no significant
implication unless there exists in the economy
some net money fixed claims on (or to) the
government,1' whether in the form of money
or in the form of interest-bearing debt. How-
ever, when such claims do exist, as is usually
the case, then the wealth effect has significant
implications. In particular, a system satisfying
assumptions A.x to will generally possess
a position offull employment equilibrium,
contrary to Keynes' conclusion.This is be-
cause VO/Pnowincludes a component which
is inversely related to the price level P. Thus,
by making W, and hence P, sufficiently small,
itis generally possible to make real wealth
and consumption so large and the rate of sav-
ing and investment so small that the com-
modity market can be cleared with a positive
rate of interest, consistent with the clearing
of the money market. In terms of Figure x,
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the value of r clearing the commodity market
is no longer a constant r but, instead, a de-
creasing function of P, i.e., a curve falling from
left to right.At least for sufficiently low P
this curve may be expected to lie to the right
of the ordinate axis and to intersect there the
LL curve.
This conclusion is not without interest from
the standpoint of the history of economic con-
troversies. But it does not imply by any means
that one can rely on the Pigou-Scitovsky ef-
fect mechanism as a practical stabilization de-
vice, and that, if only wages were sufficiently
flexible, a market economy could never be
plagued by lack of effective demand. For one
thing, the conclusion is valid only so long as
we assume that redistributional effects can be
neglected, and that the elasticity of price ex-
pectation is no larger than unity. Furthermore,
in depressed situationsin which a system
without a government-money fixedliability
would have no solution under wage flexibility,
the size of deflation required to re-establish
full employment might well be such as to pro-
duce even more damage than widespread un-
employment. Thus, even if the cure could be
counted on not to kill the patient —whichis
doubtful —therewould be a great deal to be
said for a less gruesome remedy such as fiscal
policy.
Another implication of the wealth effect is
that under the conditions of case (s),which
are empirically by far the most relevant, the
convenient classical proposition that "money
is but a veil" is not warranted. But to keep
the role of the wealth effect in proper per-
spective, it should be noted that the same con-
clusion would hold even in the absence of this
effect as soon as we drop any of the heroic
assumptions A.i to A.5. In short, while there
is really no ground for holding that in the "real
world" money is ever strictly neutral, the lack
of neutrality is due only in negligible portion
to the Pigou-Scitovsky effect.Indeed, within
the range of variation of prices characterizing
a normal healthy economy, that wealth effect
is likely to be so negligible that, were it not
for other forces, especially wage-price rigid-
ities, money would be very nearly neutral. In
particular, interest rates would be nearly un-
affected by monetary policy, and prices would
respond roughly in proportion to the money
supply.Since in the long (and even not so
long) run, rigidities can be neglected, I would
concludethatneutrality and thequantity
theory —inthe sense of a stable relation be-
tween the money supply and the value of out-
put at any given interest rate —isa good
long-run approximation, subject, however, to
the stricture that in the long run monetary
institutions may gradually change. In the case
of really rapid inflation, the Pigou effect may
be a little less negligible but still of secondary
importance in comparison with the redistribu-
tionaleffect.Furthermore,givenalarge
change in M, the proposition that the price
levelwill change roughly in proportionis
likely to provide a good approximation, once
the change in M has come to an end. Thus,
the significance of the wealth effect appears to
be primarily technical, but its empirical rel-
evance would seem to be small, at least under
normal conditions.
III
Implications of the Modd Under Wage Rigidity
A. The Strict Keynesian Version.As al-
ready noted, wage rigidity can be said to exist
if the wage rate W will not be bid below some
level W0 even though at this wage rate there
is an excess supply of labor; and the rigidity
is "effective" if the market clearing value of
W is less than W0. The implications of wage
rigidity will be examined first in terms of what
may be called the "strict Keynesian version"
of the model, which assumes pure bank money
and no national debt (and thus no Pigou ef-
fect) and competitive behavior in the com-
modity and the capital markets and on the
demand side of the labor market.
Under these assumptions in the absence of
wage rigidity the dichotomy holds and the
real system (i) to wouldpossess a solu-
tion for all the real variables. Let X, N, r, and
(P/W) denote this solution for the correspond-
ing variables and let us labelitthe"full
employment" solution.With wage rigidity,
however, the dichotomy breaks down, for though
P does not appear separately in (i), W appearsTHE MONETARY MECHANISM 89
separately in (6), and thus the nine real equa-
tions contain ten unknowns. The equilibrium
value of the real variables depends then on the
money supply M, as well as on the rigid wage
W0, and more specifically on their ratio M/WO.
This conclusion, and its implications, can be
illustrated by the simple graphical apparatus
of Figure 2, if we are prepared to make a few
2
convenient simplifying assumptions.In par-
ticular, suppose that, to a first approximation,
the, demand for money can be treated as ho-
mogeneous of first degree in money income and
not significantly affected by wealth, i.e., M" =
L(r,Y)=VL*(r).Then inorderforthe
money market to be cleared we must have
YL* (r) =M,which implies
(k.i) Y/w=
Taking M and W as given parameters, this is
a relation between Y/W (income in wage
units) and r, shown in Figure 2 as the MM
curve.(Note that the Keynesian device of
using labor as the numeraire is a very natural
one since the rigid wage provides a stable unit
of measurement.) This curve can again be re-
garded as the graph of income velocity as a
function of interest rates, except for a propor-
tionality factor, M/W. Thus, a change in the
ratio M/W will cause the curve to shift up or
down in proportion to the change.
Next, from the real part of the system one
can derive a second relation between these
same variables which must be satisfied for the
commodity and labor markets to be cleared.
For this purpose we first derive from (4b) a
relation between P1W and X, which repre-
sentsin essence the Marshallian short-run
supply function for commodities (short run,
because K0 is fixed). By means of this relation
and (5b), consumption demand given by (i)
can be expressed in terms of X and r only, say,
C =C*(X,r).Substituting this result and (2)
into and oneobtains an expression of
the form
C*(X,r) + I (X,r) =X
(the initial condition K0 being subsumed in the
functional form), which can be solved for X in
terms of r, say
(k.2) X=x(r).
For any given value of r this relation yields
that level of output for which the sum of the
corresponding consumption and investment
demands just equal output, and the commodity
market is cleared.Finally, by multiplying X
by the corresponding supply price P7W, we
arrive at the desired relation between P7W =
(P1W)X and r, say
(k.3) Y/W =y(r).
It is represented in Figure 2 by the yy curve
and is shown only for values of Y/W
(Y/W), since for larger values there would be
an excess demand for labor,i.e.,the labor
market would not be cleared (nor could the
rigidity be effective).
Since the assumption of competition in the
commodity markets precludes the possibility of
a falling short-run supply function —i.e.,P1W
must be a nondecreasing function of X —the
slope of the function y(r) depends on that of
the function x(r). This slope referred to the r





anddenote respectively the marginal pro-
pensity to consume and invest with respect to
changes in real income, and C,* and 1, are the
correspondingpropensitieswithrespectto
changes in r. The first factor + 1,.) can be
taken to be negative sinceis negative and 1,.,
whatever its sign, is most unlikely to outweigh
it. The second factor is a generalization of the
conventional multiplier, sometimes called the
"supermultiplier," and is generally assumed to
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be positive. If so, X, and hence 311W will be•
a declining function of rasshown in the figure.
It should be observed, however, that, contrary
to a common view, there is really nothing im-
possible or unstable about the supermultiplier
being negative (or zero) in some regions and
the graph of yy rising from left to right (or
being parallel to the ordinate).
The intersection of MM and yy giyes the
equilibrium values, say (Y/W) and and
these values clearly depend on M/WOwhich
controls the position of MM. The equilibrium
value of real income X*, can then be obtained
by substitutinginto(k.2), (P/W)* from
X* and the supply function and so on; and they
must all be functions of M/W0.
In our graph the equilibrium position is one
ofless than "full employment."Full em-
ployment could be reached only with a larger
money supply in wage units which would shift
up the MM curve to a position where it inter-
sects the yy curve at the full employment point
The money supply required to
reach this position can be seen from (k.I) to be
(M/W) =(Y)W)L* (r).Underwage flex-
ibility the adjustment would of course occur
through the market process as unemployment
would cause W to fall, and hence M/W to rise,
until the labor market is cleared. But under
wage rigidity it can only come about by an ex-
pansion of the nominal money supply to the
level M' =(M/W)X W0. This expansion can
be achieved by the monetary authority either
by directly enforcing the correct money supply
M' or by picking and enforcing the correct rate
of interestandletting the money supply seek
its appropriate level M'. (Both processes may,
of course, go on simultaneously.) Note that in
the present model both monetary expansion and
money wage reductions act only through shifts
in the MM curve and lead to the same value of
Y/W and r,andto differences only in money
prices and income. This "Keynesian" result
depends, however, on our having assumed away
a "Pigou-Scitovsky" effect, by supposing G to
be zero.
We need still to consider what would happen
if the initial money supply were such that the
MM curve passes above the full employment
point, as is the case for the curve M"M" in
Figure 2.Here,of course, if wages are only
rigid downward, the classical mechanism takes
over; the rate of interest being initially too low,
there is excess demand in the commodity mar-
ket which bids up prices and wages; the rise in
wages eventually reduces the effective money
supply M/W, shifting down the MM curve,
until it intersects the y.y curve at the full em-
ployment point. The process just described
corresponds to what is usually called "demand-
pull" inflation.
Oversimplified as our model is, it brings into
sharp focus the predicament of the money
authority in a system with rigid wages, namely,
to continuously pick and enforce the correct
monetary policy (the money supply M', or the
interest rate;, or both) under inadequate knowl-
edge of the relevant portion of the MM and yy
curves and their shift through time. Also the
consequences of errors are asymmetric. If it
follows a more "loose" policy,it generates
demand-pull inflationor pricerises which,
under wage rigidity, are largely irreversible.
If it follows a "tighter" policy it engenders un-
employment and not merely deflation —pre-
sumably a somewhat lesser evil as long as con-
tained within limits. In reality the problem is
further complicated by thefactthatthe
monetary authority may be expected to pursue
the double goal of full employment and price
stability.Unfortunately, these two objectives
will be inconsistent with each otherifthe
exogenously determined wage rate is such that,
when combined with the full employment price-
wage ratio (P/W), it implies a full employ-
ment price level, P =(P/W)X W0, higher
than the historically received one. Thisof
course the "cost push" case.If the monetary
authority pursues full employment it cannot
prevent a rise in prices; while if it refuses to go
along and expand the money supply enough to
insure full employment at the given wage, it
will certainly cause unemployment, while it
may not even succeed in preventing some rise
in prices.
The dilemma is even more dramatic if the
wage rate is controlled by a mechanism where-
by money wages tend to rise at a rate depend-
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rate of change is larger than the "rate of in-
crease of productivity"(the rate at which
P/W falls) at rates of unemployment larger
than what might be regarded as unavoidable
frictional unemployment (see, e.g., [25]). Ac-
cording to some views this is the predicament
of our times, but I don't propose here to assess
this claim or, even less, to propose remedies.
In concluding this section it is well to call
attention to two types of situation where to
reach and maintain full employment is beyond
the power of the monetary authority. One is
the well-known case where the full employment
rate of interest r is negative (or possibly very
dose to zero), represented in Figure 2 by the
curvey'y'.It correspondstoa situation
where, in an economy with flexible wages,
there would be no set of prices and interest
rate capableofsimultaneously clearingall
markets. The system can have a solution only
if wages are rigid and unemployment isal-
lowed to develop, permitting the elimination
of the excess supply that would otherwise arise
at any positive rate of interest. In fact, the
fall in employment is accompanied by a reduc-
tion in supply X. To be sure, this fall tends
to reduce also the demand, but only to a
smaller extent, as consumption, at least, is kept
up by initial wealth and the expectation that
the fall in income is but transitory in nature.
(In Keynesian terms, the marginal propensity
to consume is less than r.) Thus, at some suf-
ficiently low level of employment and output,
the excess supply tends to disappear, and the
system finds a resting point. A very aggressive
monetary policy might at best bring output
close to the ordinate of the point at which the
y'y' curve cuts the vertical axis.12 Only fiscal
policy can get the system back to full em-
ployment (cf. section IV).
The other case where monetary (as well as
fiscal) policy is powerless is the case of "real
wage rigidity." Here, because of union pres-
sure, legislation, minimum subsistence levels,
or otherwise, the real wage cannot be reduced
"Eventhe most aggressive monetary policy can at best
force rtozero, and cannot force the money supply above
the demand arising at this interest rate and the price level
corresponding to the given wage rate and the level of output
Xx(o).To make monetary policy more effective would
require very special devices such as making money sufficiently
expensive to store.
below some level, say (W/P)m, and this level
exceeds the marginal product of labor cor-
responding to the given production function
(including the stock of capital) and full em-
ployment of labor.(Full employment in this
connection might be defined in terms of some
standard labor force participation and work
week, or in terms of the potential supply
available at the fixed real wage.) There will
then be an effective ceiling on output, X and on
Y/W, below the full employment ceiling ex-
hibited in Figure 2.Anyattempt to expand
employment beyond that ceiling, through ex-
pansion of the money supply (or fiscal policy),
will only succeed inincreasing prices and
wages without increasing output and employ-
ment. The situation just described frequently
takes the form of a "balance of payments
problem." The attempt to expand employment
and income increases imports, forcing a de-
valuation, or equivalent measures, which in-
crease the price of imports, and lead finally
to a rise in money wages and prices. This type
of situation, which some hold to be common
in underdeveloped economies, can be remedied
only if the wage rigidity can, be broken or
productivity increased through technological
progress and capital accumulation, provided
this does not immediately result in a commen-
surate rise in the rigid real wage.
B. Modifications of the Keynesian Model:
Imperfections in the Commodity Market and
Wealth Effects.The assumption of a com-
petitive commodity market, which justifies the
rising supply function of the previous sec-
tion, may be replaced by an alternative one,
possibly more realistic and certainly more
convenient.It is the assumption that prices
tend to represent a roughly constant markup
on unit laborcost,possibly reflecting the
prevalence of market imperfectionsofthe
oligopolistic type. An alternative formulation
of this same hypothesis is that labor income
WN is a fairly stable share of total income
PX, at least in the neighborhood of full em-
ployment, Xi]. Indeed,a constant markup
onunitlaborcostmeans:
P =(i+ m) (WN/X),
where m is the markup.
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WN='(PX), I+m
where i/(i + m) is the constant share of
labor income in total income. The empirical
evidence seems, on the whole,tosupport
such a stability, at any rate in the medium
run. To be sure, as output f'uctuates below,
and up to,full employment the share of
profits in income tends to fluctuate with out-
put. But total property income is the sum of
profits, interest, and rent income, and the share
of the latter two components moves in the op-
positedirection,imparting stabilitytothe
share of total property income and hence also
of labor income.
Suppose further that in the short run N is
approximately proportional to X, i.e., that the
elasticity of output with respect to labor input
is close to i.This hypothesis does not seem
to be grossly inconsistent with the empirical
evidence, at least in the neighborhood of full
employment.(Itis,however,inconsistent
with the assumption that the real wage is
equal to the marginal product of labor, for then
the elasticity of X with respect to N would be
equal to the labor share of income, which is
well below unity.) Under this further assump-
tion N/X can be approximated by a constant,
say, n, and consequently P/W becomes itself
a constant or
(4.i) P/W=
an equation that replaces the original (4b).
The parameter irisof course a constant only
at a given point of time. It may' be expected to
fallover time as productivity, X/N, rises
through technical progress and the accumula-
tion of capital, and hence labor input per unit
of output, n, falls.If (4.1) holds, then the
demand for labor is no longer given by (5)
but directly by solving the production func-
tion (4a) for N in terms of X and K0. Finally
we may wish to recognize that, in the short
run, the labor supply may be rather inelastic
with respect to the real wage rate, and hence
may be adequately approximated by a con-
stant, say N1. Then equation (6) is replaced
by
IN'NI if #(X, K0)Ni
(6.i) w0if K0) <N'
These various modifications do not change
the count of equations or unknowns of Model
II. However, the resulting system —callit Iii
—issomewhat easier to see through. For, so
long as W is rigid at W0, P itself can be regard-
ed as given exogenously (since it is proportional
to W0). Hence, instead of solving the system for
Y/W in terms of r, we can solve it for V/P.
But V/P is X and hence its solution in terms
of r is simply (k.2). Similarly, equation (k.i)
can be rewritten as V/P =(M/P)/L(r)and
Figure 2 can be redrawn with the more conven-
tional and convenient variable V/P measured
on the ordinate, and the money supply stated in
"real" terms, M/P.
The implications of this model are roughly
the same as those discussed in the previous
section, but easier to comprehend and expose.
In particular, the price level P may be regarded
as determined by the rigid wage (together
with labor productivity and the constant mark-
up) provided that the money supply is no larger
than what is required to transact a full employ-
ment income at the price level corresponding
to W0. But if the money supply is larger, so
that the first line of equation (6.i) holds, then
P is determined by the money supply,=
M/L(r,V/P),and the wage rate is determined
by P and hence, indirectly, again by M.
The implications of the model are also not
appreciablyaffectedifone recognizesthe
existence of a money-fixed government debt,
G. In terms of the graphical analysis of Figure
2, the.main effect of G is found to be that equa-
tion(k.2) must be changed to
(k.2') X =V/P=x(r,G/P).
Accordingly,the graph of this equation —the
yy curve —isnot independent of the value of
P and hence of W0. In particular, a fall in W0,
by reducing P and increasing real wealth and
consumption, would require a smaller rate of
investment and, hence a larger value of r to clear
the commodity market for any given X.It
tends therefore to shift the yy curve to the right.
The full employment level of V/P might also be
affected, via the labor supply, but presumably
not significantly, at least for reasonable changes
in P.Similarly the money market clearing
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(k.i') L(r,Y/P,G/P) =M/P.
Hence, the position of MMdependsnot only
upon the real money supply M/Pbutalso di-
rectly on P and hence W0. Given M/P, a fall
in W0 and P should tend to increase the de-
mand for money, i.e., reduce velocity for any
given r, shifting MM downward.
The main implication is that monetary ex-
pansion and money wage cuts need not have a
symmetrical effect on output and the other
real variables, since the equilibrium value of
these variables, while still a function of M
and W, no longer depends merely on their
ratio. Pure monetary expansion still affects the
equilibrium by shifting up the MM curve. But
a wage cut of the same proportion would shift
up MM somewhat less (because of the wealth
effect on the demand for money), and would
also shift yy to the right.If, as seems likely,
the wealth effect on the commodity market is
larger than that on the demand for money, a
wage cut will tend to result in a somewhat
larger increase in X than would monetary ex-
pansion. But the difference may be expected to
be altogether negligible: a priori considerations
as well as empirical estimates [i J suggest that
the shift in either curve from the wealth effect
is likely to be minor, for reasonable changes
in W0 and reasonable assumptions about the
ratio of G to aggregate net worth —say,o to
20 per cent.In part, this is due to the fact
that the change in wealth resulting from the
"deflation" is likely initially to affect consump-
tion only moderately, the rest of the effect being
spread in time.
Note, finally, that because wage deflation
tends to shift the yy curve to the right —pro-
videditdoes not generate expectationsof
further fall in prices —itcould conceivably
lead to an expansion of employment even in
situations where monetary policy as such is
powerless. Hence, across-the-board wage cuts
might appear to provide a possible alternative
to fiscal policy. But, as already noted at the
end of section II, this view has little practical
merit. For even if we wave aside the problem
of enforcing an over-all wage cut, this approach
provides at best a weak and unreliable tool,
inconsistent with the maintenance of a stable
price level.
Iv
The Role of Government Monetary
and Fiscal Operations
Theessentialimplicationsofgovernment
fiscal operations can be formalized by the addi-
tion of two equations to Model II and certain
modifications in some of the remaining ones.
The main modifications are the introduction
of total tax receipts and other fiscal parameters
in the consumption function and possibly in
some other equations such as (2), and
(i);theaddition of government purchases of
goods F to the definition of aggregate demand
(i), and the purchases of labor services, to
the demand for labor on the right-hand side of
(8); and the addition of the government stock
of capital,in (2),and (s).Thetwo
additional equations are:(i) a tax collection
equation, which may be considered as part of
the real system, of the general form
(ro) T=t(X,VO/P, P,[rJ),
where Tdenotestaxreceiptsnet of transfer
paymentsmeasured in real terms (i.e., meas-
ured in MM's) and {r]denotesthe relevant
set of tax parameters;(ii)the government
budget identity, to be added to the monetary
set,
(M.8)
The left-hand side is the budget deficit in money
terms, denoted hereafter by D. On the right-
hand side, Mt may be usefully defined as "net
government money" or the difference between
the amount of money issued by the government
(if any) and the amount of bank-created money
held by the government. It is also convenient
for present purposes to replace (M.4) and
(M.5) by the single equation
(M.4g) M =Bb+ M*,
while dropping the variable Mb.
After these additions and modifications, the
set of equations (i) to (io) plus (M.i) to
(M.3) turns out again to form a closed sub-
system in the original variables plus T, but
involving now a new setof"fiscal policy
parameters," to wit, F, F,,, and [r]. Hence in
examining the implications of the "government
model," it is permissible to concentrate on this
subset and to disregard again the bond market
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someoftheserelations and inparticular
(M.4g) and (M.8) are useful to clarify the
relations between monetary and fiscal policy,
which are essentially linked through debt man-
agement. In particular, from these two equa-
tions we can derive the relation
This relation serves to make clear that, in
principle, through appropriate monetary and
debt management, monetary and fiscal poli-
cies can be made entirely independent of
each other. That is, a given deficit (or sur-
plus) D can be made consistent with any change
in M through appropriate changes in Bb,the
amount of credit extended by the banking sys-
tem to the rest of the economy, or in G, the
amount of government debt held by the private
sector. It is for this reason that, in our model,
we can continue to treat the money supply M
as exogenously given even in the presence of
government fiscal operations. And we define
monetary policy as the control of the money
supply and not merely of the amount of bank
credit.
The role of fiscal policy and its relation to
monetary policy can again be analyzed through
a graphical apparatus analogous to that of
Figure 2 and set out in Figure 3.
3
MONETARY VERSUS POLICY
The money market clearing conditions are
basically unchanged and so is the nature and
interpretation of the MM curve. Its position is
again controlled by the real money supply
M/W and possibly also to a minor extent
directly by W, through the wealth effect. As
for the commodity market, through a series of
substitutions of the type described earlier and
a few suitable simplifications and approxima-
tions —suchas neglecting direct government
purchases of labor —wecan obtain a condition
stating the equality of demand and supply in
this market of the form:
(g) C* (X, r, G/W, T, [r])
+I*(X,.r, [rJ)+F =X.
If we further use (io) to eliminate T, the above
equation can be solved for X in terms of r and
fiscal parameters. From this solution in turn
we can derive the relation
(k.3g) Y/W(P/W)X
=(P/w)x*fr,F, [r],G0/W),XX.
For given values of the fiscal policy "param-
eters," F and {r], this equation can be looked
at as a relation between Y/W and r, represented
in our graph by the yy curve. Its position in the
plane depends of course on fiscal policy, and this
dependence can be conveniently approximated
by a series of fiscal "multipliers" describing
the upward (or downward) shift of the curve
in terms of the change in V (given r) per unit
change in the indicated parameter. The f or-
mulae below, obtained by total differentiation
of equation (g), above, or (io) or both, pro-
vide a sample of such multipliers' effect on real
income X. The effect on Y/W can be obtained
by multiplying these formulae by P1W, (if
P1W can be taken as a given parameter). The
symboldenotes here the marginal effect on
consumption of an increase in tax payments
(usually assumed to equal the marginal propen-
sity to consume with respect to income,
with sign reversed) and isthe marginal
change in tax receipts per unit change in income
before taxes.
(i) Effect of unit change in expenditure, F:
(ii) Effect of an increase in tax payments T
or, equivalently, of a decrease in deficit D, ex-
penditure constant (under the approximation
that consumption depends only on the tax
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(iv) Effect of an increase in expenditure
matched by an equal increase in taxes (bal-
anced budget multiplier):
=(i-4- C")J(x— — 14
dFIdT=dF
l J
If the relevant marginal effects are roughly
independent of the magnitude of X (and T),
then a given fiscal change would shift the yy
curve parallel to itself; however, this need not
be the case in general. If one drops the assump-
tion that P/W is independent of X, then each
of the above expressions must be multiplied by
(i + E)(P/W) where E is the elasticity of
P/W with respect to X, which may also vary
with X.
This analysis of how various possible fiscal
operations shift the curve up or down must,
however, be qualified in one important way:
it is strictly valid only so long as the shifted
curve remains below the full employment ceil-
ing Y/W. In principle, this ceiling might itself
respond to fiscal policy, though the responsive-
ness is likely to be slight in the short run and
may be ignored for present purposes. Once the
shifted curve bumps against the ceiling, fur-
ther changes in the fiscal variable will obviously
have zero multiplier effects(in real terms);
and to see how they affect the economy one
needs a very different kind of analysis, much
along the traditional lines of public finance.
But before taking up this point, one may re-
view the more or less conventional analysis as
to the relation between fiscal and monetary
policy as stabilization devices. Suppose that,
for an initially given set of policies, the MM
curve and the yy curve can be represented by
the two solid curves of Figure 3, intersecting at
point a, below full employment. This situation
Thisexpression could be negative, even though r —
is positive, if dX/dF) t.> iinwhich case an increase
in F will Increase T by a larger amount, reducing the defi-
dt. Then an increase in D can be obtained only by reducing
F, and hence X.
"This multiplier Is usually stated to be unity, but this
conclusion is seen to hold only under the special assumptions
C. = =0.
T
may be visualized as one actually prevailing, or
as the one that would tend to come about under
a status quo policy. There are then two "pure"
policies and very many mixed policies that
might be used to shift equilibrium to (or at
least toward) the full employment ceiling. One
is pure monetary policy, which would consist
in expanding the money supply or enforcing a
lower interest rate or both, shifting the MM
curve to the position M'M' and establishing full
employment at m, Pure fiscal policy on the
other hand would consist in manipulating taxes
or expenditure or both, shifting the yy curve to
the position y'y' and reaching full employment
at f.
Wherein lies the difference between position
m and f, aside from the difference in r, and in
the income velocity of circulation, which can
be picked up from the graph?Since, by as-
sumption, both full employment positions,
output X and employment N will be the satne.
The difference consists therefore in the utiliza-
tion of output as between private consumption,
public consumption, and capital formation.
i. Suppose, first, that fiscal policy took the
form of increased expenditure, tax structure
constant. Then, at least to a first approxima-
tion, consumption C will be the same at m and
f, and the difference will be found in the utiliza-
tion of X —C.Clearly, f will involve a sirialler
amount of private capital formation, 1, and a
larger use of X by the government. Total capi-
tal formation will depend further on the way F
isdivided between Fc (government capital
formation) and F —Fc(expenditure on cur-
rent account).
2. If, on the other hand, the shift in yy is
brought about entirely by personal tax reduc-
tions, F constant, then higher consumption re-
places a portion of private capital formation
which is repressed through the higher interest
rate (higher and lower here always mean rela-
tive to m and not to a).
3. Finally, tax reductions might partly take
the form of "investment incentives."Then
consumption is likely to expand somewhat less
and investment to contract somewhat less than
in case 2. However, some reduction in invest-
ment relative to m is still almost sure to occur.
Infact,a reductionintaxes,no matter
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of taxes —disposableincome at /ishigher than
at m. For I to be as high as at in, the tax in-
ducement toinvest, which increases yields
permitting the higher interest rate at f,would
have to induce larger saving out of a given
disposable income, and sufficiently so to offset
the increased disposable income. This is a most
unlikely outcome, especially if one believes that
a higher rate of interest is more likely to reduce
than to increase saving. Thus, paradoxically,
reliance on tax inducements to invest instead of
on monetary policy to stimulate demand is
likely to generate a lower rate of investment.15
In addition, it will tend to produce higher yields
on investment and higher market interest rates.
In general, one may conclude that the main
differential effect of using tax incentives in-
stead of monetary policy to stimulate invest-
ment, when either method could be effective, is
to produce higher yields which are in turn con-
sistent with higher market interest rates. This
difference might be desirable in the context of
certain balance of payments problems which
are, however, beyond the scope of the present
"closed economy" model.
The conclusion to be drawn from this brief
analysis is that, in so far as full employment
could be maintained by purely monetary de-
vices —i.e.,where the initial yy curve lies en-
tirely sufficiently within the positive quadrant
—thechoice between monetary policy and
various types of fiscal policy to achieve the ap-
propriate level of aggregate demand must be
based on traditional considerations. These are:
the relative merits of private versus public con-
sumption in choosing between C and F —F';
the relative "social" yield of private versus
government capital formation in choosing be-
tween I and PC;andfinally, on "intergenera-
tion" comparisons in choosing between total
current "consumption" C + F —on the one
hand, and total capital formation I + FC on the
other. As I have argued in some detail in [i 8],
Somemight question the empirical relevance of this
conclusion on the ground that I am ignoring here the cor-
porate form, and that tax inducement to corporations might
increase corporate saving and thus total saving and private
investment.Basically, my position on this point is that
corporate saving, except possibly in the very short run, is a
substitute for, and not an addition to, saving out of con-
ventional disposable income. This conclusion follows readily
from the M-B-A consumption function in combination with
the set forth in (zr].
by pushing capital formation at the expense of
consumption we increase the stock of capital
and real income available to the community in
the future, at the expense of the current genera-
tion.I have also argued that a neutral policy
might be regarded as one that makes the cur-
rent generation pay for the government services
it is currently receiving, and that such a policy
requires, by and large, collecting currently in
taxes an amount equal to F —F'.Lower taxes
make future generations pay for the services
enjoyed by the current generation, while higher
taxes, in essence, make the current generations
pay for services enjoyed by future generations.
There remain to consider briefly two cases.
The first, when we start out from a position of
full employment, requires very little additional
comment. Here, an increase in government ex-
penditure must clearly be justified on grounds
other than maintenance of full employment. If
the increased expenditure is not accompanied
by higher taxes, then consumption will be un-
changed and hence the whole increase in F
must come from a reduction in I, as the govern-
ment taps private saving that would otherwise
have gone into capital formation. This is the
standard case on which rests the "classical"
argument that deficit financing shifts the bur-
den to "future generations" (cf. [31andthe
references cited there, and [i8J).Since the
reduction in I and expansion of government
borrowing will tend to be accompanied by
higher interest rates, an appropriate restrictive
monetary policy will be called for. In terms of
Figure 3, this situation could be represented
as a shift of the commodity market curve from
yy to y'y'.It requires a shift of the money
curve from MM to M'M', in order to offset the
higher velocity of circulation accompanying the
higher interest rate.
If the increased expenditure is accompanied
by a matching increase in taxes there will still
be some shift to the right of the yy. curve, as
consumption will tend to fall by less than taxes
(the multiplier effect of a balanced budget).
Hence, again, private capital formation I will
have to be restricted somewhat through a
higher •interest rate and a tighter monetary
policy. The maintenance of private investments
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propriate budget surplus put at the disposal of
investors, to offset the reduced private saving.
There is, second, the "Keynesian" case where
the yy curve crosses over to the second quad-
rant. Here (aside from the rather impractical
monetary cures mentioned earlier) fiscal policy
is the only remedy, at least to the extent neces-
sary to shift the yy curve to a position where it
can make contact with monetary policy. Even
in this situation a case can be made in principle
forfavoring government capitalformation
over other ways of stimulating demand, since, as
I have argued in {i8], there will otherwise be a
"burden" on future generations, although, in
any event, the burden will be small In relation
to the benefits accruing to the current genera-
.tiofl.
This analysis of the modus operandi of mone-
tary and fiscal policies and their implications
suggests, at least to me, that the case for a cur-
rently balanced budget, and hence for relying
on monetary rather than on fiscal policy as a
first line of defense in counteracting shifts in
the forces controlling aggregate demand, is
somewhat stronger than might have appeared
some time ago. However, the choice of a proper
mix involves many more aspects than those we
can develop here, including considerations of
reliability of the tools and of feasibility in a
given concrete institutional setting. In partic-
ular, exclusive reliance on monetary policy,
whenever this policy could, in principle, do the
job, might require swings in the money supply
and interest rates of a size that might prove un-
settling to the working of the economy. (See,
however, the argument of the next section.)
These considerations support a policy of built-
in stabilizers with reasonably high marginal tax
take(which, remember, includes transfers).
Such stabilizers tend to moderate the swings in
time in the position of the yy curve resulting
from shifts in the investment or consumption
function or both, thus reducing the burden im-
posed on monetary policy.On the same
grounds, a good case can be made for some
countercyclical variation in expenditure and
tax parameters, although at least from present
evidence one might have reservations about the
suitability of tax cuts announced to be but
temporary (cf. [i8] section IX). But there
still remains a prima-facie case for balancing
the budget overa suitable spanoftime
(cyclically balanced budget) in so far as this
is consistent with full employment, unless a
convincing case can be made for discriminating
between generations.
V
Imperfections in the Capital Markets —
theAvailability Doctrine
The models on which we have relied so far
assume, at least implicitly, a well-functioning
competitive capital market in which invest-
ments are limited and brought into line with
saving through the mechanism of the rate of
interest or cost of capital.In such a model
there exists a single short-run equilibrium rate
of interest which measures both the return to
lenders and the cost to borrowers, and also
equals (Or at least is not less than) the internal
marginal rate of return to all units.16 There is
also no need to give separate treatment to finan-
cial intermediaries: all loans may be regarded
as extended directly from the lending or sur-
plus units to the final borrowers needing funds
to finance their expenditure.
That this assumption is unrealistic probably
no one would have disputed seriously. It was,
however, the merit of the availability doctrine,
advanced in the postwar period, that it made
a convincing case for the proposition that disre-
gard of certain institutional imperfections of
the capital market leads to an unsatisfactory
and seriously distorted view of the modus oper-
andi of monetary policy and its consequences
(see, e.g., [24] [25] [28]). Actually,the
promoters of this doctrine seem to have been
largely motivated by a specific issue of mon-
etary policy: the advisability of abandoning the
policy of pegging the yieldof government
securities, which in turn made it impossible to
maintain close control over the money supply.
They were primarily interested in establishing
that, even if one accepted the then-prevailing
view that aggregate demand was very inelastic
with respect to interest rates (i.e., the elasticity
Note that even if we wished to recognize the existence
of aplurality of maturities, under our present assumption
of certainty, the current return —interestplus capital gain
—wouldbe the same on all maturities and equal to the
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of our y(r)functionwas close to zero), aban-
donment of that policy and re-establishment of
effective limitations on the quantity of money
would not result in a sharp rise in interest rates,
consequent collapse of the price of government
securities, and soaring cost of servicing the
national debt. To support this contention, they
advanced a number of arguments, varying con-
siderablyingenerality andpersuasiveness.
Here we shall be concerned primarily with one
argument which seems to have the greatest
validity and general applicability: the proposi-
tion that interest rates charged to borrowers by
financial intermediaries are largely controlled
by institutional forces and slow to adjust at
best; and that the demand for funds is accord-
ingly limited not by the borrowers' willingness
to borrow at the given rate but by lenders' will-
ingness to lend —or,more precisely, by the
funds available to them to be rationed out
among the would-be borrowers.
The implications of this proposition can be
grasped most easily by considering one limiting
case. Suppose the task of making credit avail-
able to units in need of financing requires spe-
cialized knowledge and organization andis
therefore carried out exclusively by specialized
institutions which we may label financial inter-
mediaries. That is, surplus units, whose wealth
exceeds their holding of physical assets and who
carry the balance of their wealth in the form
of claims on other units, do not lend directly to
the deficit units, but instead lend to, or acquire
claims on, the intermediaries. The interme-
diaries in turn lend to the final debtors of the
economy at some rate, say r',which,at least in
the short run, may be taken as institutionally
given, and adjusts at best only slowly to market
conditions, as indicated below. Let us also as-
sume initially that the rate r'issuch that the
flow of net demand for credit from interme-
diaries (gross borrowing less repayments) ex-
ceeds the net flow of funds acquired by them
and that the two are brought into equality by
rationing the available supply among the po-
tential borrowers. The rate r'inturn also con-
trols the rate intermediaries pay to their credi-
tors or depositors, say
Underthese conditions the flow of borrowing
and borrowers' demand for commoditiesis
limited not by the cost of borrowing r'butby
the flow of funds made available to interme-
diaries by primary lenders. Also the single rate
rofthe perfect market model, measuring simul-
taneously (i) the return to primary lenders, (ii)
the cost to final borrowers, (iii) the internal
marginal rate of return from investments, and
(iv) the opportunity cost of holding money, is
replaced by a plurality of rates. Accordingly,
the demand for money can no longer be re-
garded as a function of the rate of interest r,
butwill depend instead on the opportunity
cost which will vary between forlending
units and the internal rate for rationed units.
Unfortunately, the internal rate is no longer
obtainable from market quotations, nor isit
otherwise directly observable.
Some measure, however, or index of prevail-
ing internal rates might be derived from the
investment function, equation (2) of our model.
Suppose we solve this equation to express ras




Under perfect markets this function would give
the internal rate corresponding to the given
value of I and X. The same would be true
under rationing, if rationing were "efficient,"
i.e.,if the flow of investment were allocated
among units in the very same way in which it
would be distributed through the price mech-
anism under perfect markets. Since rationing
cannot be perfectly efficient, the opportunity
cost will presumably var.y from unit to unit, but
r8 might still provide a reasonable indicator of
prevailing internal rates. Accordingly, the de-
mand for money might be approximated by
replacing in equation (M,2) the variable r with
the variables r(,,andr8, or also r' and r8 on the
ground thatis itself a function of r'. The
same substitution must of course be made in
equation (i).
Except for these modifications of equations
(x) and (M.2) and the re-interpretation of
(i), or its equivalent (3.a), as defining the
index r8, our original system of equations (i)
to (M.3) of Model II can still be used to for-
malize the functioning of an economy with capi-
tal rationing of the type described.Further-
more, if we treat r' and asexogenously given,
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in the twelve original endogenous variables
(except that risreplaced by r8).
Theworking of this system can again be
clarified by a graphical analysis of the type of
Figure 2, and exhibited in Figure 4.Specifi-
4
S0MS IMPLICATIONS OF THE "AVAILABILITY DocriuNE"
cally,from the first nine equations in ten en-
dogenous variables we can derive again a
relation between X and r8,whichit is now con-
venient to write as r8= R(X). This equation
expresses the relation between. the index of
internal rates and the level of output when the
commodity and labor markets are cleared at
the corresponding level of output, which means
in particular that the rate of investment equals
the rate of saving. Stated differently and some-
what less precisely, it shows the internal mar-
ginal rate of return prevailing when the level
of aggregate demand is X and the flow of re-
sources available for investment is equal to the
rate of saving prevailing at this level of output.
Since to each value of X there corresponds a
value of P/W we can also obtain a correspond-
ing equilibrium relation between r8andY/W,
which is shown in Figure 4 as the RR curve.
This curve is shown as falling from left to
right on the same grounds on which the yy
curve was drawn with a negative slope in
Figures 2and3; a larger income makes possible
a larger rate of investment which in turn implies
a lower marginal rate of return.
As for the money market, by assuming as a
convenient approximation either .that P/W can
be treated as a constant and G =o,or that
is homogeneous of first degree in money lii..
come and not significantly affected by wealth,
we can write the market clearing condition as:
L(Y/W, r',r9) = M/W.For given values of
M/W and r',thiscondition yields a second re-
lation between Y/W and r8,shownagain as the
MM curve. The general shape of this curve
must be similar to that of the corresponding
MM curve of Figurehowever, its elasticity
with respect to the variable on the abscissa
must be smaller, since raisonly one of the rates
affecting the velocity of circulation while the
other, r',isconstant by assumption. The inter-
section of the two curves yields the equilibrium
value of Y/W and Tft,say(Y/W)* and
fromwhich the equilibrium value of X and
other variables can be inferred. The assumed
value of the parameter r'isalso shown in the
figure. Under certain assumptions, the gap be-
tween r'andcanbe taken as an indicator of
the size of the rationing gap (or fringe of
unsatisfied borrowers), the size of the demand
for credit unsatisfied at the lending rate r'.
Itis apparent from our figure that the work-
ings of a model with capital rationing of the
type considered are not radically different from
those of the original Model II.In particular,
if we start from a position of full employment
equilibrium, an upward or downward shift in
the position of the RR curve, reflecting, e.g.,
an improvement or deterioration of investment
opportunities, would lead, respectively, to "in-
flation"or unemployment, unlessoffset by
appropriate changes in the money supply. Also,
in a situation of less than full employment
equilibrium, such as the one assumed in our
figure, unemployment could be cured by an
appropriate monetary expansion.However,
under capital rationing this outcome could
come about without any change in the lending
rate r'.
Themechanics of this operation are not dif-
ficult to trace out. The expansion of the money
supply is initially accomplished by a relaxation
of rationing by banks and a consequent expan-
sion of lending. However, as income expands
in response to the direct increase in investment
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higher rate of investment can be sustained
without further monetary expansion through
the increased flow of saving, which in part re-
suits also in an increased flow of credit avail-
able from intermediaries.
Similarly, an increasein W,M constant
would tend to result in higher prices and a fall
in the rate of real investment and income,
partly moderated by a rise in the velocity of
circulation under the influence of the increase
in r8.Interms of our figure, the MM curve
shifts down and (Y/W) *fallsas the rise in Y,
induced by the higherr8,isproportionally
smaller than the increase in W.
While r'maybe taken as given in the short
run, it may be expected to adjust gradually
over time, tending toward some normal rela-
tion to But because this adjustment is a
slow one, we may infer that even ifswings
sharply and rapidly over time in response to
cyclical and other forces, r'willtend to fluctu-
ate over a much smaller range. Thus, the capi-
tal rationing mechanism provides a plausible
way of reconciling moderate fluctuations in
market rates with a widely shifting and interest-
inelastic investment schedule.
We must, however, stop to consider what
might be expected to happen if, as the result of
a rapid decline in investment opportunities,
the RR curve were to shift downward to a po-
sition such as R'R' in our figure.This new
curve intersects MM at a, but this intersection
could not possibly describe a position of equi-
librium. It implies in fact an equilibrium value
ofsmallerthan r'whichis impossible since,
clearly, for every borrower the internal rate
must be no less than r'.Whatis involved here
is that at a, with the lending rate r'borrowers
are unwilling to borrow all that the interme-
diaries would have available to lend and the
rate of investment is less than the rate of sav-
ing, so that income must fall.
In order to exhibit the new equilibrium posi-
tion, let us assume at first that the rationing
gap can dwindle to zero, intermediaries being
willing to lend to anybody prepared to pay r',
andthat under these conditions r3canbe as low
as r'.Then,as far as the commodity market is
concerned, equilibrium could be reached at b,
where the perpendicular through r'intersects
R'R'. At this point, in fact, r8equalsr'andthe
commodity market is cleared, since b is on the
R'R' curve.(In other words income at b is
such that the rate of investment demand at r'
equalsthe rate of saving.)
What happens to the money market condi-
tion? As intermediaries are unable to lend all
the funds they receive, they accumulate cash
balances, reducing the supply of money outside
intermediaries, which is the relevant measure
of M, and causing the MM curve to shift down
to the point where it also intersects the R'R'
curve at b. This is, however, only one possible
outcome; the other possibility is that the bank-
ing system will be unable to maintain the money
supply at the initial level as the flow of debt
repayment exceeds the flow of credit demanded
at r'.Thusthe fall in M in the hands of the
public may occur in part through intermediaries'
accumulation and in• part through a reduction
of total money supply. Of course, the untapped
lending power of both banks and interme-
diaries may gradually put downward pressure
on r'leadingto a rise in X, a reactivation of
idle intermediaries' balances or an expansion
in bank money, or both.
Insofar as lending institutions may not be
willing to lend to all borrowers prepared to
pay the rate r',a"minimal" rationing gap must
exist in the new equilibrium position; hence
the equilibrium point may tend to fall some-
what below and to the right of (b) on the R'R'
curve, and correspondingly the MM curve must
shift down further till it goes through this point.
It appears from the above analysis that the
recognition of the role of intermediaries and
market imperfections in the guise of sluggish
lending rates and of direct rationing rather
than price rationing has certain significant un-
plications. First, it helps to account for fluctua-
tions in market lending rates which appear
rather modest inrelation to likely cyclical
swings in the return from investment. Second,
it implies that monetary policy may affect ag-
gregate demand without appreciably affecting
lending rates, at least in the short run. Third,
it suggests that monetary policy —understood
now as the control over the power of banks to
create money rather than over the actual money
supply —maybreak clown under less stringent
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case. Because of sticky lending rates monetary
policy may become powerless even when the
value of r8 corresponding to a full employment
output is well above zero.
The model we have used can be considerably
enriched by relaxing various oversimplifica-
tions. For instance, one can allow for a class
of "prime borrowers," who are able to borrow
directly from the public as well as from inter-
mediaries and banks in a roughly competitive
market, at a rate which,in contrast to r',
willtend to be sensitive to variations in the
internal rate r3.Whilethese refinements must
be passed by here, it is worthwhile to review
briefly the relevance of the imperfections de-
scribed to the problem which provided the
original motivation for the availability doctrine,
namely, the consequences of pegging or drop-
ping the peg on government securities.This
task can be accomplished by merely adding
borrowing by the government (a "prime" bor-
rower) to the model we have discussed, and
hence a stock of government securities. In ad-
dition, we must take into account some institu-
tional features of the American monetary sys-
tem, and notably that the money supply is con-
trolled by the "Central Bank" through the
size of its demand liabilities.
Clearly, under perfect capital markets the
yield on government securities, r9,mustcoin-
cide with the rate of interest r.Anyattempt on
the part of the Central Bank to impose a lower
yield could only result in its having to acquire
the outstanding stock with a corresponding
increase in its liabilities and in the potential
money supply. Consider now the situation un-
der the imperfect market model. Here govern-
ment bonds can be held either by primary lend-
ers or by banks or by intermediaries.Since
primary lenders have the choice of holding
either governments or claims on intermediaries,
their demand for governments, at a given point
of time (when their total portfolio can be as-
sumed as given), must be an increasing func-
tion of r9anda decreasing function of
Similarly, the demand of intermediaries and
banks must be an increasing function of r9and.
a decreasing function of r'.Hence,treating
asa function of VP,thetotal demand for
governments might be written as
—G(r', rD).
(This function might well include additional
variables, such as the size of the rationing
gap. However, the simplest formulation above
is adequate for present purposes. Note also
that the demand depends on initial condi-
tions subsumed in the functional form.) Hence,
clearing of market requires G(r', rg) =G.
With r' exogenously given, this condition yields
the equilibrium value of r9.In general one
might expect Yg<r' < r8, implying that market
imperfections of the type under consideration
tend to reduce the cost of government borrow-
ing.
To examine the consequence of pegging and
unpegging in a context similar to that in which
the issue was debated, let us suppose we start
from an initial position offull employment
equilibrium with the yield on governments at
Supposenext that there occurs an upward
shift in RR, leading in turn to some rise in r'.
Then if the money supply were kept unchanged
(or somewhat decreased to offset the rise in
velocity) the equilibrium value ofwould also
rise. Suppose, however, the Central Bank tried
to peg r9 at the initial level As under per-
fect market conditions, this pegging could only
be accomplished at the cost of permitting an
expansion in the money supply, since at
there would arise an excess supply of govern-
ment bonds which the Central Bank would be
forced to acquire. The expansion in M would,
of course, result in an expansion of lending and
of aggregate demand, which under full em-
ployment would imply inflationary price in-
creases.
Consider next the consequence of dropping
the peg and putting an end to monetary expan-
sion.Under perfect market conditions this
would result in all rates and yields including
rQ moving to that rate r which limits real in-
vestment demand to the full employment flow
of saving; r is of course the same as the full
employment rate r8, given by the intersection of
the shifted RR curve with the full employment
line Y/W = Especially if investment
demand, and hence the RR curve, is very in-
elastic, the upward shift in RR would result in
a large increase inimplyinga corresponding-
ly sharp increase in r9.But, with market im-102 THEMONETARY MECHANISM
perfections of the type considered, r9iscon-
trolled by r'and andnot directly (or at
least not significantly) by r9.Hence,so long
as r'doesnot respond much, at least initially,
to the shift in RR and the main effect of the
shift is to increase the rationing gap,will not
be appreciably higher than r. Hence dropping
the pegging policy will not result in sharp
change in r9,atall commensurate to the shift
ffl ;8,asclaimed by the supporters of the avail-
ability doctrine. Actually, this conclusion may
be considered as a special case of a more gener-
al result: becauseistied to r',andnot direct-
ly to '?, rationing not only tends to reduce on
the average the cost of government borrowing
but also tends to reduce the amplitude of fluc-
tuations in r0,ascompared with what they
would be under perfect market conditions.
VI
Some Concluding Remarks: The Role of the
Money Supply and the False Dichotomy Between
Quantity Theory and Income-Expenditure Theory
By way of conclusion and partial summary of
this survey I propose to examine in this section
what are the implications of the analysis for
the critical question: how important is the role
of monetary factors, and particularly of the
money supply, asa determinant of the level of
money income, output, and prices? Interest in
this long-standing issue has been rekindled by
a number of recent writings, and particularly
by a challenging contribution of Friedman and
Meiselman inwhich the authors suggest
that prevailing views in this matter readily fall
into two opposing camps. One camp, which
may be identified with the quantity theorists,
holds that the quantity of money 9s a key fac-
tor in understanding and even more controlling
economic change"; and presumably from this
view it is but a short and unavoidable step to
accept Friedman's recommendation that dis-
cretionary monetary management be replaced
by the simple rule of expanding the money
supply at a constant rate.The other camp
holds that "the stock of money matters little"
and is supposed to consist of those embracing
the "income-expenditure theory."From the
test carried out by Friedman and Meiselman to
assess the relative merits of the two points of
view, it turns out that the "income-expenditure
theory" is operationally defined as the hypothe-
sis that current measured consumption is a
linear function of measured disposable income,
plus corporate saving, plus corporate profit in-
ventory valuation adjustment, plus a couple of
further adjustments.'7
It should be readily apparent that the view
of the monetary mechanism which emerges
from this survey —andwhich I like to think
is widely shared at the present time, at least
initsbroadoutline —cannotpossibly be
forced into either of these camps. Nor is this
surprising. In the first place the "income-ex-
pendituretheory"asoperationallydefined
aboveisin no way inconsistent with the
quantity theory, at least as defined by Fried-
man himself, as the hypothesis of stable de-
mand for money (cf. [6], especially page i6).
And in the second place both accepting and
rejecting either of these theories is perfectly
consistent with a wide range of views about
the importance of the money supply as a
determinant of income, including at one end
the view that it is the key factor and, at the
other end, the view that it matters not at all.
We suggest that the Friedman and Meisel-
man analysis, as well as many of the arguments
over the importance of money, suffer from a
failure to distinguish clearly between endog-
enous and exogenous forces and between struc-
tural relations and "reduced forms."
To make this point clear, let us take as a
starting point the model underlying the anal-
ysis of section IV. It consists of a system of
thirteen equationsinas many endogenous
variables which will, in general, admit of a
solution for all the endogenous variables in
terms of exogenous variables and the param-
test actually carried out by Friedman and Meisel-
man consists in correlating consumption, C, with "offset to
saving," A, which isthe sum of investment, government
deficit, and net exports. But these two variables will be
linearly related if and only if C is a linear function C + A,
which, using well-known accounting identities and defini-
tions, can be readily shown to be equal to the sum of dis-
posableincome,corporatesavings,corporate inventory
valuation adjustment, excess of wage accruals over wage
disbursements, and statistical discrepancy (cf. [5], appendix
A)'. We are not aware of any author's having advanced
such a formulation of the consumption function and Fried-
man and Meiselman unfortunately have not provided the
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eters of the structural equations.Consider
in particular the solution for income V. So long
as wage rigidity holds, we can write this solu-
tion as
Y=J(M,F, [r];W, [P1)
where F and Er] are fiscal policy parameters
and [p]isthe set of relevant parameters
of the structural equations,reflecting tech-
nology, tastes and initial conditions.Alterna-
tive points of view about the importance of
money and the real cleavage of opinions can be
profitably stated and clarified in terms of the
properties of the "reduced form" function f
of equation (i) implied by the underlying set
of structural relations.18
To say that output and prices are totally
unaffected by monetary factors means that /
does not include M among its arguments. We
shall refer to this point of view as the "effec-
tive demand only"theoryabbreviatedas
EDO. Clearly, for EDO to be valid the system
of equations obtained after deleting (M.2)
and (M.3) should contain a determinate sub-
system involving F, X, and V. Furthermore,
this subsystem must not involve r; for if it did
its solution would also determine uniquely the
demand for money (cf. equation M.2) and
the value so determined would in general not
be equal to the supply; in other words the
entire system wouldthen beinconsistent.
Among the implications of this result the fol-
lowing are relevant for present purposes.
First, EDO is not equivalent to what is
usually called the "theory of effective demand"
—theassertion that the level of output is de-
termined by the effective demand for it and
not by the productive capacity of the economy.
That proposition is hardly more than a truism,
even if a fruitful one —justlike the proposi-
tion that a change in effective demand can
affect income only through a change in M or
in the velocity of circulation, or both, The
essence of EDO is the proposition that effective
demand is totally unaffected by the supply of
money either directly or indirectly.
Second, EDO is perfectly consistent with
the quantity theory, as it requires no special
assumptions about the demand for money ex-
The idea of relying on the reduced form f for contrast-
big alternative points of view was first suggested to the
author by Albert K. Ando.
cept that it should not be a function of X and
P only.
Third, EDO bears no relation whatever to
the"income-expenditure theory"tested by
Friedman and Meiselman. For it requires no
special assumption about the form of the con-
sumption function or its stability, except that
consumption should not depend on the rate of
return from assets. It is true that the "elemen-
tary model" frequently used for introducing
students to Keynes relies on a linear consump-
tionfunction,say C =c,, + cY, and exog-
enously given investment, I. This model falls
under EDO, but because of the assumption
about I and not about the consumption func-
tion.
The implications of EDO can be conven-
iently visualized in terms of Figures 2 and 3.
Since the commodity market equations now
determine a unique value of V, say totally
unrelated to the value of r, the yy curve de-
generates to straight line parallel to the ab-
scissa and at a distance V*/W0 above it.Of
course, the value ofand hence the position
of yy depends on parameters of the commodity
market equations and on fiscal parameters and
this dependence is in fact described by the re-
duced form f.'9 For instance, in the "elemen-
tary classroom model" we have
=(c0+ I)/(i —c)=j(c0,c,I)
if the government is excluded, and a somewhat
more complex expression involving fiscal param-
etersifthe governmentisincluded.The
intersection of yy and MM determines the rate
of interest, which therefore depends on the
money supply and is in fact the only variable
that monetary policy can affect (cf. [6], p. vi).
Our analysis leads us to reject the EDO
theory and hence to the conclusion that M
appears as an argument of the reduced form
f. For it accepts the view that, in general, an
increase in M will result in an increase in effec-
tive demand, basically by way of increasing
investment demand. This increase in turn may
come about partly because the expansion of
M will initially tend to reduce the cost of
capital (though this reduction may be only
It might be noted in passing that the EDO model
runs into some logical difficulties if the yy curve were to be
above the full employment line—i.e., If effective demand
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transitional) and partly because it permits a
relaxation of rationing and a larger flow of
investmentexpenditure,financedinitially
through newly created money and subsequently
through the larger flow of money saving.
Consider next the view that income is com-
pletely determined by monetary forces,i.e.,
by the demand for and supply of money,
independentlyofconditionsinthe"com-
modity" markets. We shall label this point
of view the "money only" theory and abbreviate
it as MO. Clearly, for MO to be valid, equa-
tions(M.2) and (M.3) must form a de-
terminate subsystem involving I', and M". But
a two-equation system can be determined only
if it contains no more than two unknowns. It
follows that a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the MO theory to be valid is that the
demand for money should be a function of V
and V only, or say M" =L(Y).Thus, MO is
not equivalent to the quantity theory but only
to a very special form of it; and it is perfectly
consistent with the view that consumption is
a linear function of current income and cur-
rent income only. In fact, it requires no special
assumption about any of the other equations
of the system, except that rmustappear some-
where in these equations.2°
By equating demand and supply one finds:
M =L(V),implying
(ii) V =L-'-(M),
where L' is the inverse of the function L.
Comparing this result with (i) we see that
under MO the function /issimply L', the
inverse of the demand function for money.
Accordingly, stability of the demand for money
implies stability of the function f.
Interms of our figures 2 or 3, MO implies
that the MM curve degenerates to a straight
line parallel to the abscissa and at a height
L'(M) (Y/W)
=
. Withincome already de-
termined by the monetary part, the only func-
tion left for the commodity market curve yy
is to determine the rate of interest at the point
where it crosses the above line. Thus changes
If rwereto appear nowhere in the remaining ixequa-
tions these would also form a determinate subsystem in xx
unknowns (the original thirteen minus M4 and r),andits
solution for V would generally be inconsistent with the
solution generated by (M.a) and (M.3).
in the commodity market, and in particular in
the consumption and investment function, or
in fiscal parameters do not affect income at all,
but only the rate of interest.21
One special case of the MO theory is the
"elementary model" frequently used for intro-
ducing students to the quantity theory, which
takes the form L(Y) =(x/V)Y,where the
constant V is the velocity of circulation. Then
equation(i)becomes V =VM.Under the
further assumption that (i) V is in fact con-
stant in time, at least up to a stochastic com-
ponent which is both unpredictable and un-
correlated with any of the remaining variables
of the system;(2)full employment output
grows at an approximately constant rate g;
and itis desired to make money income
grow at a rate which is consistent with the
maintenanceoffullemployment, provided
prices are, stable;one isfinally led to the
Friedmanrulethat monetary management
should consist exclusively in expanding the
money supply at g per cent per year.22
Our analysis rejects MO because it acknowl-
edges that the demand for money depends also
on the rate of interest or, more generally, on
the rate of return obtainable by exchanging
money forotherassets.This dependence,
which even Friedman accepts in principle, is
amply supported by empirical evidence. To
admit that r enters in(ii) —orsomewhat
loosely that the velocity of circulation depends
on r —mayappear to require no more than a
minor amendment to the MO theory.For, it
may be argued, equations (M.2) and (M.3)
still imply a relation between income and the
21will be noted that theMOtheory as stated is only
a theory of the determinants of money income; in order to
derive from it propositions about P and X one needs some
theory of the relation between these three variables which
can only be derived from other equations of the system. In
so far as this relation can be established without reference
to the "commodity demand equations" (z) and (2),asis
true for instance in our own model II (cf. equation 4.b),
it can still be said that the level of income is independent of
the state of effective demand. And this conclusion remains
valid under the somewhat more general demand for money
equation M2 =L(P,X).
This policy prescription can be shown to be valid under
somewhat more general assumptions than those stated in
the text.In particular, if the demand for money can be
approximated by the form L(?,X) = as Friedman
has suggested, then the required expansion of the money
supply is M/M =aX/X =ag.THE MONETARY MECHANISM 105
money supply, namely M =L(r,Y).In par-
ticular suppose for the sake of argument that
L(r,Y) is homogeneous in V and can therefore
be written as L*(r)Y. Then solving the above
equation for V we can write
(iii) V =V(r)M,
so that V is still proportional to M, except that
the proportionality factor depends on r.Or,
in other words, V is still controllable through
M except that M must be adjusted to offset
changes in velocity.
This line of argument however is worthless.
For equation (iii) in contrast to (i)is not a
reduced form equation; it contains the endog-
enous variable r which like all other variables
is a function of all parameters, including M.
Thuswhether and to what extent a change in
M affects V depends on its effect on r and
V(r), and this effect cannot possibly be in-
ferred from (iii) alone.It depends on what
relation exists between V and r, a relation that
can only be derived through the commodity
markets and is embodied in the yy curve of
Figures 2and3.It is only through this rela-
tion —whichis well defined if EDO does not
hold —thatwe can eliminate r from (iii) and
obtain a solution for V in terms M and other
parameters. This solution is, of course, simply
the reduced form f.
Becauseour analysis implies that M ap-
pears as an argument of the function f,it
agrees with Friedman and Meiselman that the
money supply is an important factor in under-
standing and even in controlling the level of
income. But because it also implies that the
function /isnot merely'the inverse of a stable
demand function for money but rather the re-
sult of a complex interaction of monetary and
real forces it leads equally to rejection of the
view that the money supply is the only device
for controlling Y, that it is always an adequate
device, and most of all that it is in any mean-
ingful sense the "cause" of economic insta-
bility.
The usefulness of M as a stabilization de-
vice depends critically on the nature and form
of /.Supposewe fix the value of the fiscal
parameters at some stated level, and consider
the set of values of V achievable by varying
M (for given W0). This set may not include
the full employment value (Y/W). In terms of
Figures 2and3 this will happen whenever the
yy curve intersects the full employment line
sufficientlyfartotheleft —theso-called
liquidity trap. There will then be a ceiling to
Y/W short of Y/W, either because r and V
approach some asymptote, or because beyond
a point the money authority loses the power
of expanding the money supply. We suggest
that the real cleavage of expert opinion is not
at all between those who hold the MO doctrine
and those holding the EDO doctrine but rather
revolves around whether V is achievable by
monetary policy nearly all of the time, only
some of the time, or hardly ever. We are in-
clinedtoward the first-mentioned view,at
least for reasonable values of the fiscal param-
eters —sayvaluesimplyinganapproxi-
mately balanced budget in the neighborhood of
full employment. But we are ready to admit
that this view is debatable and that, in any
event, the past is not necessarily a good guide
to the future.
In so far as V is achievable by monetary
policy,if a larger or smaller value of V is
allowed to develop one might be justified in
saying that the accompanying unemployment
or price rise results from an inadequate or
excessive money supply. But this is quite dif-
ferent from saying that therefore the behavior
of the money supply is the cause of instability.
In the first place, because money is not the
only possible tool for stabilization and not
necessarily the best (cf. section IV), failure
to avoid fluctuations could be attributed to
fiscal policy as well as to inadequacies in the
money supply.Second, and much more im-
portant, recognition that the relation between
V and M embodied in the function fdepends
not only on the demand for money but also
on the remaining equations of the system has
widespread implications. 1ff were simply the
inverse of the demand for money equation, as
asserted by MO, and if one also accepted the
various other assumptions that justifythe
Friedman rule, then it would indeed follow that
departures of V from its stable path could be
attributed only to autonomous departure of
the money supply from the growth path im-
plied by the rule. But this conclusion becomesioô THE MONETARY MECHANISM
invalid, even if the demand for money is quite
stable, once we recognize that the function /
willshift around under the impact of shifts in
the demand functions for commodities. Such
shifts will cause deviations of 1' from the de-
sired path even though M is on the path. Even
if these deviations could be offset by appro-
priate changes in M, we cannot say that M is
the cause of instability any more than we can
say that the fact that headache can be avoided
by taking aspirin makes aspirin the cause of
headaches. The cause of the instability lies
in these shifts and not in autonomous changes
in M. On the contrary such changes are neces-
sary if the shifts in the commodity markets are
to be effectively offset. Thus, just because this
analysis agrees with Friedman's on the impor-
tance of money and on the stability of the de-
mand for money it leads to a categorical re-
jection of the notion of entrusting the control
of the money supply to his simple mechanical
rule.
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